Rendering the Dictator's Manual Inoperable....The Great Arab Revolutions of 2011

The Arab revolutions erupting since late last year have each been marked by their own unique features. Although the

The Great Arab Revolutions of 2011

By Esam Al-Amin

declared goals of each revolution have yet to be fully realized, their primary objective of overthrowing authoritarian rulers was spectacularly achieved within a historically short period of time.

While it took 28 days of continuous protests to depose the dictator of Tunisia, a country of 10 million people, it required only 18 days of massive demonstrations to accomplish the same feat in Egypt, which has a population of 85 million.

On February 15 in Libya, a largely desert and tribal country of 6 million, people marched to free an attorney, Fathi Terbil, who was arrested for representing the families of political prisoners at Abu Salim prison in the eastern city of Benghazi. Previously, in June 1996, the regime had gunned down 1,200 prisoners who were political opponents of the government. After a longstanding policy of blaming the victims, the regime did not acknowledge this crime until 2004. As people were demanding the release of Terbil in a peaceful demonstration, the security forces started shooting at the protesters, killing and injuring many of them.

Two days later, encouraged by Egypt's revolution, an uprising erupted in Benghazi protesting the brutality of the regime. It has since rapidly spread throughout the country. At the time of writing, the Libyan dictator has lost much of his nation and is now besieged in his fortified compound in the capital, Tripoli, trying desperately to hold on to power.

Similar uprisings have broken out in Jordan, Algeria, Yemen, Bahrain, Morocco and Iraq. Other countries such as Sudan and Mauritania are on the brink. In short, most Arab countries, including long-established monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, are threatened with widespread popular uprisings that would drastically change the strategic power structure in the region.

The spark for Tunisia's revolution was Mohammad Bouazizi setting himself ablaze in the southern city of Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 2010, protesting against the authorities who insulted him and seized his sole means of sustenance.

The downfall of Zein al-Abideen Ben Ali's regime in Tunisia on January 14 was itself the spark for the Egyptian revolution, which erupted eleven days later. By February 11, the Egyptian regime had also collapsed when its head, Hosni Mubarak, was forced to resign in disgrace after much obstinate and arrogant behavior. Within days, Mubarak's fall set off several uprisings across the Arab world demanding the downfall of several regimes, particularly in Libya, Bahrain and Yemen.

Clearly, there are many shared features among Arab regimes, but the most common is their authoritarian nature, regardless of whether the regime is officially a monarchy or a republic. All dictators have ruled their subjects with repression and brute force. Ben Ali ruled Tunisia for 23 years, while Mubarak's tyranny lasted for 30 years in Egypt. Muammar Qaddafi has been Libya's despot for more than 41 years; Ali Abdullah Salih has been Yemen's absolute autocrat for 33 years.

The Sunni family in Bahrain, the Al Khalifa, has ruled Bahrain and its Shi'a majority since the 18th century. The prime minister, who is the uncle of the current king, has been in this position for four decades. Likewise, the Saudi royal family has been ruling the country without much participation of its 26 million people for almost eight decades.

Whether the country is a wealthy oil producer, such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, or struggling economically, like Tunisia and Egypt, poverty, illiteracy, and lack of basic infrastructure, such as health care, education, electricity, or a sewage system, are pervasive. Last year, for instance, many people died in Jeddah, the second largest city in Saudi Arabia, because of the lack of the necessary infrastructure to handle heavy rain, despite the country's vast wealth.

Moreover, large-scale corruption and accumulation of the country's wealth in the hands of the ruling elites are common characteristics across these regimes. All of this wealth could have transformed these societies as far as development and growth. The Saudi royal family, which includes six thousand princes, is said to control over three trillion dollars worldwide.

Invariably, the first reaction to the popular uprising by each regime was to clamp down and use brutal force. The more ruthless the tactics employed by the security forces, the more people became angry and took to the streets raising their demands. The Egyptian regime, similar to others, was always several steps behind the people. As casualties mounted due to the regime's continuous repression, the protesters persisted on raising their demands. Their first demand was for the deposed president to pledge not to seek re-election nor impose his son as the future president. They also called for the dismissal of his interior minister. As Mubarak ignored their call and released his security forces beating and arresting the protesters, the demands were raised: dismissal of the government, then Mubarak's departure, and, most recently, insistence on putting him and his family on trial.

Elsewhere, when the regimes ignored the demands for dialogue with the opposition by the Yemeni and Bahraini protesters, resorting instead to the security apparatus, causing multiple deaths and hundreds of injuries, the people became enraged. Subsequently, the fall of the Yemeni regime and the Bahraini government became their primary demand.

Similarly, for several weeks people throughout Jordan were protesting and demanding the resignation of the government and the appointment of a national unity government to tackle the country's acute economic problems. By the time the King, Abdullah II, sacked the government several weeks later and opened dialogue with the opposition, the primary demand has become to change the political system from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional one, where the powers of the king are transferred to an elected government.

It seems that the longer a regime is in power, the more brutal its behavior. The Libyan regime went as far as employing foreign mercenaries to shoot mercilessly at unarmed civilians. As hundreds of casualties mounted, major segments of Libyan society abandoned Qaddafi, including many battalions from the army and the security forces, government officials, diplomats, judges, oil workers, and, most importantly, the major tribes across the country.

Ben Ali, Mubarak, Salih, Qaddafi's son Saif al-Islam, the Iraqi Prime Minster Nouri Al-Malki, as well as the kings of Bahrain and Jordan, each gave several addresses conceding some of the popular demands in the hope to stem the tide. But, in most cases, the people rejected these belated concessions, demanding revolutionary, fundamental, and far-reaching changes. In Algeria, by the time the regime agreed to lift the 19-year-old state of emergency law, the people's principle demand has become regime change.

When the tactics of sticks and carrots fail, the regime turns to the army as a last resort to crack down on the protesters. Although the army of Bahrain viciously attacked the protesters in the streets before withdrawing under pressure, the armies in Tunisia and Egypt refused to do so. In fact, in each case the military announced its support for the people, leaving the despots no choice but to depart from the scene.

The refusal of most armies to support these dictatorial regimes is very significant because it sets a trend. When the people break down the barrier of fear of the regime, no power can stop them until they achieve their demands.

Revolution vs. Counterrevolution

Alexis de Tocqueville once wrote, "In a revolution, as in a novel, the most difficult part to invent is the end." Historians will most likely debate for many years the various factors that came together to set off the uprisings that turned into triumphant revolutions. However, the most significant and distinctive feature in all of them is that they were genuine popular revolutions that were spearheaded by the youth, including as many women as men in participation, sacrifices, and leadership roles.

As the French revolution was unfolding at the end of the 18th century, French philosopher and diplomat Joseph de Maistre wrote, "The counterrevolution will not be a reverse revolution, but the reverse of a revolution." Likewise, the main challenge to the revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere is that they could be hijacked by counterrevolutionaries tied to the deposed regimes, which would then reverse the revolutions.

So, what are the main challenges posed by counterrevolutionary forces facing the Arab revolutions? People in the Arab world revolted primarily to become free, to restore their dignity, and to regain respect for themselves.

"The dictator has fallen but not the dictatorship," declared Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of the Tunisian opposition party, al-Nahdha, or Renaissance. Thus, the verdict on the ultimate success of the Tunisian revolution is still out. Will it be aborted by either infighting or the introduction of illusory changes by the counterrevolutionaries of the deposed regime to absorb the public's anger? Or will real and lasting change be established, enshrined in a new constitution that is based on democratic principles, political freedom, freedoms of press and assembly, independence of the judiciary, respect of human rights, and the end of foreign interference?

Similarly, after it deposed Mubarak, the prodemocracy movement in Egypt has been demonstrating weekly with its new chant, "The people demand to purify the regime." But to purify the regime, the revolutionaries are demanding that the ruling military council purge many institutions and dismiss many senior people tied to the previous regime. One of the foremost challenges, which the military council has been trying to avoid despite popular calls, is the dismissal of the central government and all the provincial governors, who have strong ties to the previous regime, or showed intense loyalty to Mubarak through his final days. The military council has been wavering on this demand causing much concern about the direction of the country.

Perhaps the major challenges illustrating whether the military is serious about breaking from the past and embracing the goals of the revolution are in three crucial areas. The first challenge is at the security level. The main reason the deposed regime was able to control and dominate the political scene, and rule by instilling fear and repression, is because of the state security apparatus. Until this apparatus is totally dismantled, there is a considerable threat that the revolution could be reversed, or at least hindered to the point of derailing its main objectives.

Secondly, major figures in the former ruling party, including corrupt businessmen, are trying to regroup and rebrand themselves as a new pro-revolution and reform party, in an attempt to take over the levers of state power by manipulating the public, using the huge resources at their disposal, and through their internal knowledge of how state institutions operate. Thirdly, none of the pro-regime media officials appointed by Mubarak to the numerous state print and electronic media boards, or outlets, or heads of labor unions has been dismissed. If allowed to stay in power, they would pose a threat to genuine change since, as part of the previous regime, they have every incentive to promote their people to cover up their corrupt practices, even as they falsely present themselves in the interim as reformers.

In short, like all such moments in history, the Arab revolutions face great challenges. The military will have a say in whether to go forward and propel true reforms, as demanded by each revolution, or slow down and besiege it to accommodate the interests of its opponents. In addition, a central challenge to these popular revolutions will be the external pressures applied by international and regional powers to safeguard their interests and policies, which may diverge from or conflict with the interests and wishes of the vast majority of the Arab people. For instance, Egyptians overwhelmingly want to lift the siege on Gaza that the deposed regime helped maintain. They also want to help the Palestinian factions reach reconciliation and end their divisions. Both objectives are strongly opposed by the U.S.A. and Israel.

Hence, the assertion of each revolution's independence in the face of certain Western pressures would represent the ultimate test to the success of the revolutions. If the future governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, or any other Arab country transformed by its revolution or genuine reform truly reflect the will of their people in internal as well as external policies, then the revolutions have, indeed, succeeded. If not, then somewhere along the way counterrevolutionary elements would have hijacked it, setting the stage for another corrective revolution.

The ultimate lesson to Western policymakers is this: real change is the product of popular will and sacrifice, not of foreign interference or invasions. To topple the Iraqi dictator, it cost the U.S.A. over 4,500 dead soldiers, 32,000 injured, a trillion dollars, a sinking economy, at least 150,000 dead Iraqis, a half-million injured, and the devastation of their country, as well as the enmity of billions of Muslims and other people around the world. Eight years after the U.S. invasion, the Iraqi people not only suffer from a lack of genuine democracy and the problem of widespread corruption, but also from the lack of real security and basic services. On February 25, the American-backed Iraqi government just shot dead ten people who were protesting its corruption and cronyism.

Only the vigilance of the revolutionary forces in society and their insistence on achieving their main objectives will determine the destiny and ultimate success of these revolutions. As they were launched in the streets and squares, the Arab revolutions of 2011 might be destined to stay in the streets for some time to face off against the counterrevolutionaries, until every challenge has met its response and every objective has become a reality.

In his farewell address in 1837, President Andrew Jackson said it best when he reminded his people that "eternal vigilance by the people is the price of liberty," and that one "must pay the price" in order "to secure the blessing." CP

Esam Al-Amin can be reached at alamin1919@gmail.com

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